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Introd uction

In 1977, the Illinois general assembly passed the Tax Increment Allocation
Redevelopment Act. The purpose of the act was to allow municipalities to
capture increasing property taxes to pay for redevelopment of blighted areas. The
law was amended in 1985 to include sales tax increments as well. Tax increment
financing can be defined as a mechanism that "allows a community to recapture
the increase in various state and local taxes that result from a redevelopment
project in a blighted residential, conunercial or industrial area. The tax revenues
obtained from the project which exceed the level of tax revenues generated by the
area prior to redevelopment is called the "tax increment", hence the term tax
increment financing (McLure 262)."
Tax Increment Financing (TIF) works like this: A municipality sets up a
TlF district in a blighted area where little or no development has occurred. For
large projects, bonds or contracts are sold by the municipalities to generate more
money for improvements at the start of the program. Smaller projects use the
increment for development on a "pay as you go" basis. In both cases,
improvements are made to encourage private development in the area (Grueling
23). The district's tax base is then assessed. It is reassessed at the end of each
subsequent year. The difference between the two levels is the increment. This
increment is used to help subsidize the cost of redevelopment with infrastructure
improvements and other investment incentives. While TlF looks like an indirect
tax break, it is much more efficient. If a tax break was given with the
understanding that private business would make the needed infrastructure
improvements, a free-rider problem might exist. Smaller businesses would allow
the larger ones to make the necessary improvements, while neglecting their
responsibility.
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The businesses within the new development receive little or no direct tax
break in the process. When the new businesses pay their taxes to the State and
local taxing bodies, however, the increment is channeled back to the
municipalities, so they can make the needed improvements and payoff their
bonds (if any were sold). Ideally, if TIF is successful, all parties gain. Private
investment is encouraged with infrastructure improvements and a healthier
business climate. The cities gain an expanded infrastructure and a growing
economy, and increased tax revenues down the road. The state gains
infrastructure improvements, a stronger economy, and increased tax revenues in
the future as well. However, the state can not benefit completely from a higher
tax base until the bonds are retired.
As mentioned before, the law was amended in 1985 to include sales tax
increment. This change was partly in response to municipalities long time
concern that they finance all of a redevelopment project and only enjoy a small
share of the increase in tax revenue. Municipalities were given until January 1,
1987, to set up sales tax TIF districts. The maximum life a district could be set up
for was 23 years. Over 100 TIF districts were set up in 1986. So far, cities have
sold close to $400 million dollars in bonds and contracts to finance improvements
and attract investment. Don Eslick, Executive Director of the Illinois Tax
Incremental Association (ITIA), believes that cities flocked to TIP as a direct result
of the State's underfunding of municipalities (11/12/92).
As the size of the program has grown, Governor Jim Edgar wants to
discontinue State funding. The program was not fully funded in 1992, and the
Governor vetoed the appropriation for 1993. In fact, the TIF cut was the largest
single cut in the Governors veto package (Ayers 20). While the legislature did
manage a compromise with the Governor during the November 1992 veto session
to return a portion of the increment back to the districts, a trend of severe
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underfunding emerged. Many TIF advocates are furious about this trend. Local
Government magazine states, "It is ironic that when reinvesting in America's cities
is capturing national attention, Illinois is moving in the opposite direction"
(6/1/92). This argument definitely holds merit. At a time when cities need the
most help attracting investment, the State appears to be neglecting them.
Proponents of TIF also feel that the State's lack of support will cause more
harm than just decreased investment. This is because the cities have rougWy $400
million dollars in outstanding bonds. Local Government concludes, "TIF was a
deal the State made with its municipalities to encourage redevelopment of
blighted areas. The cities plunged into projects and borrowed money on the basis
of that promise" (6/1/92). The Peoria TournaI Star adds credence to this argument
by stating, "We sympathize with Edgar's budget problems. But to pass them on to
cities that borrowed money because the state promised to pay the debts is wrong"
(7/11/92). This lack of funding by the State may cause long term problems
outside TIF as well. If cities believe that the State has not been honest with them,
they may be hesitant to enter into further partnership agreements in the future.
While there are many supporters of TIF, it is not without opposition. The
higWy respected Chicago Business letter, Crains, believes that "TIFs are one of the
all time great economic development boondoggles in Illinois" (9/14/92). Many
people also have the perception that 'TIF has been misused to finance 'sweetheart'
deals with local developers at state expense" (Ayers 21). Whether this is true or
not, there are clearly differences in the level of blight and deterioration among
districts. Many argue that development would have occurred in some of these
districts without the aid ofTIF, and that these developments merely shift jobs and
tax revenue from non TIF areas into the newly developed TIF districts resulting in
no net gain.
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With this background infonnation in mind, this study has the following
research objectives. First, the impact on the state resulting from the sales tax TIF
program will be analyzed. It is obvious that most cities, developers, and investors
love TIF. The state's relationship with TIF, however, has turned sour. It must be
detennined whether the state has made a mistake by withdrawing its support.
After the data are analyzed, the current policy stance of the state will be evaluated
to see if it is making a mistake by withdrawing its' support.
Secondly, a case study of the three TIF districts in Bloomington will be
conducted. Net job and tax revenue growth will be examined to see if districts are
merely transferring income or if they are creating jobs and revenue. Local impact
from TIF will be also be compared with the impact on the state, because what is
good for a single entity may not necessarily be good for the whole. The research
will be completed in the following order. First, the theoretical framework will
analyze the costs and the benefits for the state. Then, the economic model used
for the state and the results obtained from the model will follow. Next, the case
study of Bloomington will isolate and examine three different TIF districts.
Finally, the conclusion will tie the paper together and offer policy advice for the
state.

Theoretical Framework

Many projects can be conceived as a stream of yearly benefits and a stream
of yearly costs over their life. With TIF, there are costs and benefits to both the
city and the State. Since the cities have few complaints about TIF and the State
has many, this portion of the research will analyze the benefits and costs of TIF
from the State's perspective.
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The direct financial benefits to the State should include the increased sales
tax revenues resulting from the higher tax base in the TIF districts. There is some
argument as to whether all of this increment should be counted as a benefit, or if
development and the resulting increase in sales tax revenues in certain districts
would have occurred anyway. Supporters of TIF often cite one of the most
important statutory restrictions which states, "that the corporate authorities
ascertain that the area would not reasonably be expected to be developed without
the adoption of the tax increment plan" (McClure 262). Yet opponents believe that
many municipalities have violated the spirit of the law. While there may be some
problem with this, a Department of Revenue study found only five or six
questionable districts out of one hundred and thirty (Eslick 11/12/92).
It is important to realize that when the sales tax amendment was added in

1985, the cities were entitled to 100% of the increment. In 1988, however, an
amendment was added that reduced the increment payment to 80% of the first
$100,000 in sales tax increment, 60% of the next $400,000 and 40% of additional
revenues. This means that the state does not have to wait until a district is
dissolved to profit from the higher tax level. It is now reaping benefits during the
district's life as well. For this study, all incremental revenues retained by the state
will be counted as a benefit, while the argument that growth would have
occurred anyway in some districts will be explored separately. If a problem
exists, the benefits of the higher tax base will be qualified.
The increase in the tax base is not the only benefit from TIP. The
infrastructure improvements, new developments, new jobs, and the better
business climate that results are obviously direct benefits at the local level, but the
state benefits as well. New jobs mean an increase in state income tax revenue, and
additional income resulting from job creation has a multiplier effect on sales.
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Also, infrastructure improvements might lure out of State investment. In other
words, a better local business climate would be an indirect benefit to the State.
The financial cost to the State should be the lost tax revenue due to
increment payments. This tax forgiveness is an opportunity cost, because the
foregone revenue could have been used for something else. Opponents of TIP
believe that the State's support will grow to a massive level. One Department of
Revenue study estimated the total State cost of TIF will be $800 million dollars
(1987). The result of the DOR finding will be compared to the results here.
There are also indirect costs that must be accounted for. One of Governor
Edgar's top advisers believes that growth in a TIF district merely transfers growth
from other areas in the State, as well as areas in the municipality (Ayers 23).
There is definitely merit to this argument. A restaurant or shopping mall being
built does not mean that demand for those goods will go up. However, if the new
development produces an export (out of state) good or attracts out of state income
in some way, revenue is generated. Furthermore, if there is job creation, there
will be more income to spend on products, and revenue will be generated. Yet
even if there is a massive transfer of income from one area to the next, there
should not be a zero-sum gain. If the area gaining sales tax receipts and jobs is
truly a blighted area, many positive externalities may result. Criminal activity
may decline and the entire city will experience more balanced growth. Also. the
new development should increase competition between existing businesses,
which leads to a healthier business climate.

The Model

The research will be conducted in a two stage process. The first stage will
analyze increases in state revenue (benefits) and state expenditures for TIF
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(costs). The second stage will analyze benefits and costs that do not fit easily into
the first stage's present value formula.
For stage one, the data come from the Illinois Department of Revenue.
These data are a year by year analysis of every individual TIF district. It states
the initial sales tax base and the increment for every district since 1986.
Direct costs and benefits for the first seven years of the program are
derived as follows. For these years (1986-1992) there is data dividing the total
sales tax increment into the portion retained by the state and the portion
disbursed the districts. The amount kept by the state is the direct benefit to the
state, while the amount disbursed is the opportunity cost. Increment has been
kept by the State for two reasons. First, the 80/60/40 change mentioned earlier
has allowed the State to retain a large portion of the increment since 1988.
Second, the program has not been fully funded each year. Because of this, the
state has received some benefit prior to 1988, and even more benefit after 1988.
Remember, the increased increment kept by the state is a benefit because an
assumption that investment would not have occurred without TIP is used.
Projecting the total increment level for each of the remaining years will not
be as easy. Past increases in increment levels must be used as a reference. Here
is the actual percentage increment growth for each year:

YEARS

PERCENTAGE GROWTH

1987 to 1988

45%

1988 to 1989

37%

1989 to 1990

27%

1990 to 1991

43%

1991 to 1992

15%
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With the exception of 1990 to 1991, the increment has increased at a
decreasing rate every year. This can largely be explained because the districts are
operating close to full capacity. Once a development has been operating at 100%
capacity for a couple of years, growth (and the resulting tax base) should start to
stabilize. The 43% growth rate in 1991 may be caused by the second wave of TIF
development. The State offered a longer funding period for cities issuing bonds
between 1988 and 1991. As a result, over thirty cities entered into extensive TIF
programs during this time. With almost all of the TIF districts finished or nearly
finished with their development projects, the increment will most likely increase
in smaller proportion for each year. Furthermore, the few districts that have not
been developed yet will be hesitant to enter into large projects, considering the
State's underfunding of the program so far. With this in mind, the increment
should continue to increase at a decreasing rate. It will be estimated to increase
10% in 1993, 9% in 1994, 8% in 1995, 7% in 1996,6% in 1997, and 5% for the
remaining years of the program. It is stabilized at 5% because sales tax revenue
from successful businesses tends to rise a little each year. It must be
remembered, however, that with only six years of data on TIF, these numbers are
purely estimates and the opportunity for a bias exists.
Full funding under the 80/60/40 formula will be assumed. For simplicity
purposes, 60% will be the increment disbursed to the cities or the direct cost to
the state. Finding the state cost will not be as easy as taking 60% of the
increment, however. Since each district has a different ending date, the full sales
tax increment from each district is going to be received by the State at different
times. As soon as a district's life has concluded, the state will no longer have any
more increment expenditures to that district. Because of this, the ending date of
every individual district must be taken into account. While the ending dates for
all the districts were not available, the dates that the bonds must be retired were.
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They will be used as a proxy for the end of a district. For the few districts that
did not sell bonds, the average of the other districts will be used for an ending
date.
In reality, a district may remain active for the entire twenty three years of
the program. However, all of the increment generated in a specific district must
be used for improvements in that district or to retire bonds used to finance the
improvements. Most municipalities set up their bond schedule in relation to the
expected incremental tax growth in the districts. For the majority of the districts
that sold bonds, all of the improvements were made at the start of the program.
The increment is now only being used to retire the bonds. Since no more
improvements are being made, as soon as the bonds are retired, the districts will
become inactive. For example, Bloomington's Veterans Parkway TIF district was
financed by ten year bonds, but incremental growth has been so great that the
bonds will be retired in seven years (Hamilton). As soon as the bonds are retired,
Bloomington will dissolve the district and the state will receive the full sales tax
increment. However, if a district cannot retire its bonds on schedule, it has the
opportunity to reschedule its debt payment and continue to receive increment up
until the twenty third year. The effects of some districts dissolving before their
bonds were initially supposed to be retired, and others refinancing their debt
past their initial deadline should offset each other and make the final bond
payment date a justifiable ending date for the districts.
The different funding formulas for districts will also be investigated. If a
municipality sold bonds before June 1, 1988, after July 29, 1991, or never issued
bonds, it is scheduled to receive 100% of the 80/60/40 increment until 1998. In
1999, only 90% of the 80/60/40 is sent back to the cities. This 10% reduction
continues until 2007. No payment of State sales tax increment will be made to
these districts after 2007.
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For municipalities issuing bonds between June I, 1988 and July 29, 1991
full funding is provided for the next fifteen years. Starting in the sixteenth year,
funding is reduced 10% per year until the twenty-first year when funding is
eliminated entirely. 2011 will be the final year that the State will disburse sales
tax increment to these districts.
Each year, revenues and costs must be adjusted to present value. 1993 will
be the base year used in order to determine past and future benefits and costs
today. Therefore, any benefits and costs prior to 1993 will be adjusted forward,
and any benefits and costs after 1993 will be discounted. This is done by
multiplying the amount by a discount factor. The discount factor is dependent
on the number of years from the reference point and on the interest rate. For this
study the rate of interest will be 6.5%. This number was found by taking the
average monthly interest rate on one year government treasury bills from 1986 to
1992. Multiplying the amount of cost or benefit by the discount factor yields the
same result as using the following formula:
P.V.=A/ (1 +r)n
Where A= Amount; n=years due; r= interest rate
The discount rate answers the question, how much would have to be invested
today at the market rate of interest to yield each of the annual revenue or cost
figures in each of the future years. If a project's benefits are all in the future, but
the costs are in the present or past, the difference between the actual dollar
amount and the present value amount will be greater for the benefits than the
costs. In other words, just using the actual dollar amount would overstate the
benefits.
In summary, the annual projected incremental payment from the State
will be calculated using the following steps. The examples that follow the steps
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are purely hypothetical and address a limited time span. They are used for
simplicity purposes.
1. All of the TIF districts' 1992 increment levels will be multiplied by 10%
to achieve the 1993 incremental growth. This 1993 increment will be multiplied
by 9% to achieve the 1994 growth. This process will continue in the manner
outlined previously.
TIFS

92 Inc.

Expire

1993 Incrm.
(92 x 1.1%)
$2200
$3300
$27500
$33000

$2000

TIFA
1994
TIFB
1995
1999
TIFC
TOTAL

$3000

$25000
$30000

1994 Incrm.
(93 x 1.09%)
$2398
$3597
$29975
$35970

1995 Incrm.
(94 x 1.08%)
$2590
$3885
$32373
$38847

2. The yearly increment level will then be multiplied by 60% to achieve the level
that would be sent back to the municipalities if no districts were expired (under
80/60/40).
YEAR

INCR.

1993
1994
1995

$35970
$38847

STATE COST
(If none expired)
$19800
$21582
$23308

$33000

3. As soon as a TIF district expires, its total sales tax increment is kept by the
State and must be counted as additional State revenue. Thus, the 60% given to
the district in step 2 is added back into the state's benefit. This is done for every
year. For instance, if a TIF district expires in 1996, the State would benefit from·
the increased level forever, not just for that year.
YEAR

INCR.

STATE COST
(If none exp.)

LESS

1994

$35970

$21582

TIF A

$1439

1995

$38847

$23308

TIP A
TIFB

$1554
$2331

4. The net cost for the state will then be figured. The amount in step 3 is
subtracted from the amount in step 2 to yield this result.
1993
1994
1995

$19800-$0=
$21582-$1439=
$23308-$3885=

$19800
$20143
$19423

5. The net benefit retained by the State is the total increment calculated in step 1
minus the disbursement in step 4.
1993
1994
1995

$33000-$19800=$13800
$35970-$20143=$15827
$38847-$19423=$19424

12
6. Starting in 1999, the special funding formulas need to be factored in. If a
district receives 90% funding in 1999, its increment level is multiplied by 6% to
yield the additional state revenue. This is because 90% of the 60% State
expenditures would be 54%. The remaining 6% is kept by the State. Like the
calculations in step 3, these adjustments are subtracted from step 2 to yield total
disbursement. The adjustment process is similar to step 3 as well. This method
is used for the remaining years.
7. For each year, the cost and benefit to the state will be adjusted to present
value.

In order to analyze all these benefits and costs in an organized manner, the
following framework will be used. Six columns will be set up with each column
containing the following information.
1. The YEARS will be listed chronologically from 1986 (start of sales tax TIF)
until 2012 (the first year that the State will not make any increment payments).

2. The STATE COST will be listed as actual data from 1986-92 and as projections
from 1993-2012.
3. Similar to column 2, the STATE BENEFIT will consist of actual data from
1986-92, and projections from 1993-2012.
4,5. These two columns will contain the state cost and state benefit in PRESENT
VALUE for each year.
6. This column will contain the percent of increment RETAINED by the state in
each year. As the percentage rises, so should the net benefit for the state.

As previously mentioned, part two examines benefits and costs not
accounted for in part 1. The data come from the Illinois Tax Incremental
Association as well as the Department of Revenue1. These figures include
breakdowns between public and private investment, breakdowns between local
1The

author would like to thank Lois Mills, legislative aid to State Senator John
Maitland, and Don Eslick, Executive Director of the Illinois Tax Incremental
Association, for their overall assistance and their help in obtaining relevant
data.
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and state expenditures, job creation, and type of business activity being
performed in the district.
If development in a TIF district is largely financed by TIF funds, the TIF

program might be viewed as a massive "public works" program. However, if
private investment is large, the TIF money can be viewed as more of a catalyst
that encourages private development. Also, if a large portion of the TIF money
comes from the local sales and property tax increment, the State cannot claim to
be bearing the burden for local development. However, a small level of local
support would violate the local/State partnership intentions ofTIF.

Results

The results from 1986-1992 are very straight forward (see Table 1). The
State came close to fully funding TIF until 1989. However, in 1991 and 1992, the
State retained 59% and 74% of the increment for its own use. Over the first six
years, 76.5 million actual dollars has been disbursed to the municipalities, and
85.6 million actual dollars of increment has been retained by the State for its own
use. Adjusting to present value, these numbers are 95.2 million dollars and 99
million dollars respectively. In other words, the increment sent back to the
municipalities is worth 95.2 million dollars today, and the increment retained by
the State is worth 99 million dollars. While the benefits here outweigh the cost
for the state, it is only because the state has not fully funded the program. The
projected figures for years 1993-2012 will show the consequences of a fully
funded program.
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Table 1.
Actual State Expenditures on TIP 1986-1992
(In Millions)
Cost

Benefit

P.V.
Cost

P.V.
Benefit

Percent
Retained

1986

2.4

.4

3.7

.6

14%

1987

9.8

1.8

14.3

2.6

15%

1988

9.7

7.3

13.3

10

43%

1989

11.4

7.3

14.7

9.4

39%

1990

13.8

9.9

16.7

12.0

42%

1991

17.4

24.9

19.7

28.1

59%

1992

12

34

12.8

36.3

74%

TOTAL

76.5

85.6

95.2

99

Years

The results from 1993-2012 strengthen the municipalities' side of the
argument (see Table 2). If the State were to fully fund the TIP program, the
disbursement to the cities would increase to a high of $44.6 million in 1997 and
decrease for every following year. The amount of increment retained by the
State, however, would increase every year. Starting in 1994, the percentage of
increment retained by the State would increase yearly. This can be explained by
TIF districts that will expire and the reduced funding formulas that take effect in
1999. In fact, in 1999, the percentage of increment retained by the State would

exceed 50%. The state cost from this point forward would decrease at an
extremely rapid rate until the final payment in 2011.
Adding the 1986-1992 and 1993-2012 numbers together gives the total cost
of TIF to the State. The State would spend $569.4 million dollars ($440 million
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Table 2.
Projected Costs/Benefits for 1993-2012
(In Millions)
Year

Cost

Benefit

1993

34.0

22.7

34

22.7

40%

1994

38.0

26.6

35.6

25

41%

1995

41.0

28.7

36.1

25.3

41%

1996

42.0

32.7

34.8

27.1

44%

1997

44.6

34.5

34.7

26.8

44%

1998

43.5

39.6

31.8

28.9

48%

1999

42.5

44.7

29.2

30.7

51%

2000

37.4

54.1

24.1

34.8

59%

2001

:35.4

60.7

21.4

36.7

63%

2002

24.0

77.0

12.2

39.1

76%

2003

22.6

83.4

12

44.5

79%

2004

22.1

89.2

11.1

44.7

80%

2005

19.7

97.2

9.3

45.8

83%

2006

14.8

107.9

6.5

47.7

88%

2007

10.8

118.1

4.5

52.4

92%

2008

9.0

126.2

3.5

49.2

93%

2009

6.7

135.3

2.5

49.5

95%

2010

3.1

146.0

1.1

50.2

98%

2011

1.7

156.4

.5

50.5

99%

2012

0

164.4

0

50

100%

TOTAL

492.9

1645.4

345

781.6

P.V. Cost P.V. Ben.

% Kept
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adjusted to present value) in disbursement payments. While this seems like a
large financial burden, it is dwarfed in size by the amount of increment retained
by the State. The total benefit to the state would be $1.73 billion ($881 million in
present value). Even though the majority of the costs will be in the present and
the majority of the benefits will be in the future, the benefit level is so great that
adjusting it to present value still produces a benefit over two times the cost. This
study only calculated retained increment as a benefit until 2012. However, it
must be remembered that the State will benefit from this higher tax base every
year after 2012.
As previously mentioned, expenditures and retained increment are not the
only costs and benefits of TIF. The Illinois Tax Incremental Association recently
surveyed the TIF districts to discover what type of business activity was being
performed in them (6/30/92). Sixty-three sales tax districts are in a central
business district (downtown area); Seventeen districts primarily support a
shopping mall or commercial strip; Thirty-six districts support mixed
development (restaurants, shopping centers, auto dealerships, eeL); Finally, three
districts are industry oriented.
These preliminary figures point toward some potential benefits and costs.
Having such a large number of TIF districts in downtown areas is definitely a
benefit. Many municipalities are experiencing a migration away from the
downtown area. The result is often a highly developed suburban area and an
abandoned central business district. The high number of downtown TIF districts
suggests that municipalities will be experiencing more balanced geographical
growth. Furthermore, the presence of new businesses in an older area should
increase positive social activity and reduce criminal activity.
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The creation of new jobs is another benefit of TIF. According to a survey
of municipalities by the ITIA2, 5065 permanent and 2076 part time jobs have been
created as a result of TIF. If the average salary per worker is $12,879 dollars per
year3, the increase in State income tax can be computed. Using the 3% annual
income tax rate and assuming that two part time workers count as one full time
worker, the State has gained $2.35 million in increased income tax receipts.
This increase must be qualified. There are only three sales tax TIF districts
listed as industrial4• Since a large percentage of the TIF districts support
restaurants or retail services, there may be a transfer of income and jobs from non
TIF area to TIF districts. However, if there were a transfer, it would hurt the
cities more than it would the state. The State's support for the TIF program for
years 1986-1991, relative to the municipalities, has been 37% (see figure 1). In
other words, local sales and property taxes have accounted for 63% of all TIF
revenues. Because over 60% of the TIF revenues come from local authorities, the
risk for the municipalities is much greater. While this does not rule out a
transfer, it seems foolish for municipalities to create TIF districts if they are not
generating net growth.
Another area that must be investigated is the breakdown of private and
public investment in the various TIF projects (see figure 2). According to the
ITIA, "Each TIF dollar results in $3.65 worth of direct private investment"
(Spring 1992). This $3.65 acts as an investment multiplier. Multiplying the total
state cost of $564 million by 3.65 yields a private investment figure of 2.1 billion
dollars. If the municipalities continue to fund 63% of the program, their cost will

2The survey was not completed by all municipalities, so these numbers might
be smaller than the actual figures.
3This manner in which this number was derived is discussed in the case study.
4 While there are only three industrial sales tax TIF districts, there are over
thirty property tax TIF districts (where the State is not involved). Industrial
districts simply do not generate much sales tax revenue.
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TOTAL TIF SUPPORT 1986-1991

•

45%

Local Prop.-$78 mil.

D

State Sales-$65 mil.

11m

Local Sales-$31 mil.

Figure 1

ESTIMATED PUBLIC/PRIVATE INVESTMENT 1986-2011
6.000.000,000
5,000,000,000
4,000,000,000
3,000,000,000
2,000,000,000
1,000,000,000

o
State
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be over a billion dollars, and the private investment generated will be 3.7 billion
dollars. Adding the two investment figures together gives a total private
investment of over five and a half billion dollars. This seems like a pretty good
return on the State's investment (see figures 2).

Case Study

Like most municipalities, Bloomington became interested in TIF in 1986
when the law was changed to include sales tax increments. Bloomington set up
two districts in June of 1986. One district is along Veterans Parkway and the
other one is along Market Street on the city's west side (Krebs D1). A third
district was set up in downtown Bloomington in December of 1986. The
Veterans Parkway district, along interstate 55, contains the Jumers Hotel and
Conference Center, "Auto Row" with three new car dealerships, and Lakewood
Plaza, a 200,000 square foot center anchored by Wal-Mart (Status 1). The Market
Square district contains many restaurants and retail shops, while the downtown
area contains office space and small retail stores.
After the districts were set up, Bloomington had to decide how they were
going to finance them. The city sold 7.2 million dollars in ten year bonds to
finance the Veterans Parkway district, 7.3 million dollars in twenty year bonds to
finance the Market Square district, and 3 million dollars in twenty year bonds to
finance the Downtown district (Status 1-3). Bloomington used all General
Obligation (G.O.) Bonds. G.O. bonds are secured by the full faith and credit of
the municipality. They are attractive to investors because even if an increment in
the TIF district does not materialize, the G.O. bonds (unlike many other bonds)
still must be paid off by the city (Dirks). The city likes the G.O. bonds because it
pays a lower interest rate due to the reduction in risk to the investor.
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All three of the districts have been successful in creating sizable tax
increments and stimulating growth and investmentS (see Table 3). The sales tax
increment in the Market Square district has grown at a slower rate due to its'
seriously depressed condition prior to TIE All together the three TIF districts
have created $8.3 million dollars in sales tax increment during the TIF program.
While this large figure indicates the possibility that growth might have occurred
anyway in some of these areas, Bloomington officials claim the large figure is
merely a result of a successful TIF program and not a result of TIF districts being
set up in high growth areas. City Manager, Tom Hamilton described the
condition in the districts prior to TW. "Along Veterans Parkway, there was no
development, no intersections, and no utilities from Jumers all the way south to
Lakewood Plaza and the area was prone to chronic flooding. In the Market
Square district, most homes were on individual wells, and there was no storm
water retention, and in the downtown area, vacant buildings were commonplace
and jobs were leaving by the dozens (Hamilton)." There are few who would
claim that the Market Square and downtown areas were not severely depressed,
but many have questioned the level of blight in the Veterans district. Department
of Revenue Director, Doug Whitley states, "Any 12-year old would recognize that
(the Veterans Parkway area) was likely to be a high-growth economic area for that
community" (Predergast AS). With the Veterans district receiving so much
publicity, it is necessary to investigate it further.
Prior to 1986, the Veterans area received little attention from private
investors. Local developer, Larry Hundman, had apartment starts out on the land
that is now the TIF district, but no money to finish them (Hamilton). After
observing the lack of progress within the area, the city set up the TIF district and

SIn the two cases where there was $0 in incremental growth, new businesses
had not been set up and development had not been completed.
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built two major intersections which "opened up large parcels of land for
development" (Status 1). The city also constructed roads, water-mains, sewers,
and part of the Constitution Bike-Jogging Trail. These improvements helped
bring roughly forty million dollars in private investment (Hamilton). Dividing
$40 million by $7.2 million (money generated from bond sales) yields a private
investment figure of $5.55 for every TIF dollar. This is well ahead of the state
average.

Table 3
Yearly Sales Tax Increment

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

Market Square
$21,486
$0
$6,042
$21,871
$252,732
$537,855

Downtown
$84,965
$94,707
$300,606
$276,423
$272,816
$615,645

Veterans
$4,220
$0
$872,758
$1,653,836
$1,625,954
$1,691,581

Another positive effect of the rapid growth in the Veterans district is that
as soon as the bonds are retired, the state can enjoy the higher tax base. Tom
Hamilton states, "While the bonds were supposed to be retired in 1997,
Bloomington will most likely retire them in December of 1993, and if it weren't for
the state's underfunding of the program, the bonds would have been retired by
now." Yet TIF opponents remain adamant. Governor Edgar's TIF advisor states,
..

'The implication of the law is to help support a distressed or economically
depressed area. I would find it hard-pressed to characterize (Veterans Parkway)
as distressed or economically troubled when it started out as farmland"
(Prendergast AS). However, even if private investment had eventually occurred
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along Veterans, it would not have occurred so extensively in such a short time.
The state stands to enjoy $1.7 million in annual sales tax increment from the
Veterans district alone starting at the end of 1993. Considering that prior to the
conception of the TIF district, private development had only tried to build
apartments (unsuccessfully), the area was nowhere close to being a "high growth
area".
There does exist a strong incentive for municipalities to set up TIF districts
in potentially high growth areas. James Paetsch states, 'TIF authorities must
make an earnest attempt to reduce their risks. Assuming this to be true, it is only
logical that administrators will attempt to assemble TIF districts with a high
potential for future growth that will strengthen the tax base and can almost
ensure an increment, thus reducing risk" (Bingham 96). With a high growth area,
municipalities can almost be certain that the increment will be sufficient to payoff
the bonds. While the Veterans district prior to TIF does not fall into the category
of a high growth district., it is possible that commercial growth could have
eventually occurred. However, even if growth would have occurred without TIF,
the Veterans district is a net benefit for the state due to the quick retirement of the
bonds and the high level of sales tax growth.
There is one aspect of the Veterans district that is a benefit for the city and
not for the State. In the mid-1980's, Jumer Hotels was looking for a city in Illinois
to build a hotel. Bloomington promised to build Jumers a conference center with
TIF money if they located there. Jumers took the bait and decided to locate in
Bloomington. While this increased the tax base and economic opportunities in
Bloomington, the state as a whole did not gain. If Jumers had not located in
Bloomington, they would have most likely located in another part on the state,
and the state would still be receiving taxes from them.
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For Bloomington, Jumers is more than just a hotel. The conference center
attracts various businesses and groups from all over the state. In this sense,
Jumers is more like a primary business as opposed to a tertiary business. The idea
behind the primary / tertiary business argument is that cities should not tailor
their development policy to attract service related businesses like hotels and
restaurants (tertiary). They should be more interested in attracting industries
(primary), because it they can do this, the service sector businesses will follow.
However, with the conference center being used frequently by out of town guests,
it acts as a primary business in the sense that these guests create the demand for
more service related businesses to accommodate them during their stay in
Bloomington.
Because of all the attention focused on the Veterans district, the other two
districts often are over looked. The Market Square district provides needed goods
and services for the west side of Bloomington. This area had been deteriorating
for years and had experienced an increase in crime. With few employment
possibilities in the area, the opportunity cost for drug use and crime were
relatively low for residents without the transportation or the desire to work in
other parts of the city. Sociologist William Julius Wilson states, "..as the prospects
for employment diminish, other alternatives such as welfare and the
underground economy are not only increasingly relied on, they come to be seen
as a way of life" (Wilson 57). However, with the influx of new service related
businesses, this opportunity cost should be raised.
TIF has also been able to take the place of other social programs in urban
areas that have been cut by the state. Mayor Jesse Smart comments, "(l1F) has
helped greatly as other urban programs like Revenue Sharing, Community
Development Block Grants and Urban Development Action Grants have been
reduced or eliminated" (Status 4). By increasing employment opportunities and
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improving on poor infrastructure, TIF has gone to the heart of the problem and
more than picked up the slack for some of these programs.
The third TIF district, located in Bloomington's downtown, is similar to
downtown areas in other cities.. As new development occurs on the periphery of
cities, businesses and jobs move out of the downtown area leaving vacant
buildings to deteriorate. In Bloomington, "Heritage Enterprises (with the aid of
TIP) is developing over 50,000 square feet of space in four contiguous buildings
for office and retail uses. This project is also the first large scale historical
redevelopment project in the downtown area" (Status 4). The goal of the
downtown district is not so much to create jobs, but to maintain them. However,
the city has been extremely impressed with the number of new businesses that
have decided to locate downtown instead of in other areas (Hamilton). With all
of Bloomington's growth on the east side, maintaining and creating jobs in the
downtown area will foster a more balanced and diverse business climate.
The actual number of new businesses and new jobs in the three TIP
districts indicate a benefit for the city and the statei'. There have been twenty nine
businesses that have located in the Veterans district. Of these twenty nine, four
are relocations from other areas in the city and the rest are new. These businesses
have created 351 full time and 427 part time jobs. In the Market Square district,
there are eleven new businesses and two relocations. These businesses have
created 87 full time and 92 part time jobs. Finally, in the downtown district, there
are twenty two new businesses and seven relocations which are responsible for
497 full time and 40 part .time jobs. About half of these jobs in the downtown
district are new and the other hall are jobs that the TIP district has helped to
maintain. For instance, Union Insurance and First of America Bank are
6The information on the new businesses within the TIF districts comes from
the City Manager's office, while the information on job creation comes from
the survey conducted by the ITIA.
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responsible for 226 full time jobs in Downtown district that existed prior to the
district's conception.
All together, TIF is responsible for roughly 935 full time and 559 part time
jobs for a total of 1492. Subtracting the 226 from the Downtown district yields a
figure of 1266 full time jobs and 559 part time jobs Almost all of these jobs are in
the retail trade or service sectors. Between 1986 and 1990, these two sectors
experienced job growth in McLean County from 22, 423 to 27, 698 employees
(County Business Patterns). This means that of the 5275 new retail and service
jobs in McLean County, about 1825 or 35% are a result of TIF. One qualifying
factor to consider is that the average salary for service and retail jobs in McLean
County in 1990 was only $12, 879, while the average for all jobs was $22,159. Still,
these salaries are incomes that were not being made before. Also, the higher the
level of services in a community, the more likely other businesses and industry
will be attracted to and remain in an area. It is not a coincidence that
Bloomington is the headquarters for State Farm Insurance (Corporate and
Regional Headquarters), County Companies Insurance, Diamond-Star Motors,
and The Illinois Farm Bureau. Furthermore, the level of services has helped
attract events such as the Annual Corvette Show, National and World Softball
Finals, the illinois Special Olympics, and Illinois High School Association athletic
events.

Conclusion

Overall, the TIF program appears to be an extremely worthwhile
investment on the part of the State. The increases in sales and income tax
receipts are obvious benefits. Also, the level of private investment created
proves that the TIF program is not a "public works" program, but rather a
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catalyst for development. Other benefits such as an extremely competitive
business climate, revitalized downtown areas, and urban improvement also must
be considered.
The majority of the State's problems result from the sunset law requiring
all of the districts to be set up by January I, 1987. This caused a rush to set up
districts. These districts all are starting to prosper at the same time. Hence, the
state is now facing the majority of the opportunity costs. If the State had used
more of a "rolling admissions" style, the costs would not be nearly as condensed
into a short period of time. Furthermore, if the State had more time, it could
review the districts more closely.
While the total cost of $569 million ($440 million in present value) is a
huge investment, the total benefit must be examined. The 1987 Department of
Revenue study estimated the total State cost of the TIF program at $800 million.
The DOR study was before the 80/60/40 laws were written, so it estimated the
state would disburse $800 million to the TIF districts and not be able to retain
increment until the districts expired. This study, however, predicts a total cost of
$231 million less than the DOR study. More importantly, over $1.73 billion in
increment is estimated to be retained by the end of the program. This translates
to over a billion dollar difference between the two studies.
In the case of Bloomington, TIF has been a remarkable program for
development and redevelopment. The Market Square, and the Downtown
districts are classic examples of deteriorating areas being revived with
infrastructure improvements, private investment, and job growth and retention.
While state officials have attacked the Veterans district for violating the spirit of
the law, the state stands to benefit immensely from this district. For all of the
complaining, the state will receive 100% of the increment or $1.7 million per year

27
by the winter of 1993. This is amazing considering the state has retained a large
benefit already due to severe underfunding of the program.
For future research, the recent compromise legislation between the
municipalities and Governor Edgar could be examined The State agreed to
extend the funding period for districts issuing bonds and guarantee a minimum
funding level of $12 million per year (Legislators 1). While this legislation gives
needed stability to the TIF program, it shifts more and more of the financial
benefit to the state. With incremental growth of $48 million 1992, the state is
keeping 75% of the benefit. Also, many municipalities will now have to refinance
their debt. In the case of Bloomington, city officials are looking into rescheduling
the debt for the Market Square district; because the reduced payments by the
state will not be enough to retire the existing debt.
In conclusion, the State receives many benefits from TIE It entered into a
mutual agreement with its municipalities, yet it refuses to live up to its
obligation. Governor Edgar's TIP advisor states, "TIP is not a net advantage for
the State in most instances" (Ayers 23). First of all, TIF is a net advantage for the
State. However, even if it was a zero-sum gain (which obviously is not the case),
the program would still be a success. TIF is not meant to be a huge net benefit
for the State. Its purpose is to aid redevelopment in municipalities. Any benefits
the State receives should be counted as bonuses. Secondly, the State made a
commitment to the municipalities. Over $400 million in bonds were sold with
the understanding that the State would help retire the debt. If the State does not
honor this obligation, municipalities will have to resort to other means to retire
the bonds. Finally, the economic integrity of the State is at stake. Governor
Edgar makes the paradoxical claim that the TIF cuts were made for economic
reasons. However, with a direct net benefit of $1.16 billion, it makes little sense
that the State would cut a program that costs an average of $15 million dollars
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per year (over the 26 year period). The State should realize the benefits, honor
its' obligations, and fully fund the TIF program.
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